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LEGAL ASPECTS OF DRUG-INDUCED
STATEMENTS
LEON M. DESPRES*
I
N JUNE 1946, the prosecuting authorities in Cook County, Illinois,
administered sodium pentothal to a murder suspect who was under
arrest. The murders committed had been so horrible, and the results
of the injection were so dramatic, that American newspapers gave the in-
cident greater publicity than had ever been given to the use of a drug to
obtain a statement. The suspect was a seventeen-year-old boy, William
Heirens, who was arrested in an attempted burglary. One of his finger-
prints corresponded with a fingerprint found at the scene of a murder.
While in police custody, Heirens appeared to be feigning amnesia and gave
no direct answers to questions. The law-enforcing authorities then ar-
ranged for a psychiatrist to give him a series of injections of sodium pento-
thal, and learned that Heirens had committed three murders and a num-
ber of burglaries, ultimately found to exceed five hundred. Later, Heirens
made a written confession, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to im-
prisonment. Newspapers reported and most of them acclaimed the new
"truth serum" for its contribution to the identification and conviction of
a criminal. r
A quarter of a century has elapsed since American law-enforcement
authorities first used a drug to induce statements in criminal cases. In the
Dallas County Jail, on February 13, 1922, a physician injected scopol-
amine into two convicted criminals and established to his satisfaction
that they were not guilty of the crimes charged."" For many centuries men
have known that intoxicants release inhibitions and loosen tongues.
Odysseus observed2 that wine makes even a wise man "blurt out what
were better left unsaid." Mexican Indians have used peyotl, a vegetable,
• Member of the Illinois Bar.
'Chicago Sun, p. I.,col. 7 (July 17, 1946), p. i, col. 8 (July 18, 1946); Chicago Daily News,
P. 3, col. (July 1S, 1946); New York Times, § 4, P. 9 (Aug. 4, 1946); Chicago Tribune, p. 5,
col. 3 (July i, 1946), p. , col. 3 (July 3, 1946), P. 4, col. 4 (July 13, 1946); see also Report of
Dr. Foster Kennedy to the New York Academy of Medicine, reported in 29 Newsweek 54
(Jan. 27, 1947); 2 Science Illustrated 62 (i947).
'a House, The Use of Scopolamime in Criminology, 18 Tex. State J. Med. 259 (1927).
2 Odyssey, Book 14.
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to induce revelation of secrets. 3 For a long time, anesthetists observed
that patients under anesthesia often made spontaneous and revealing
statements. 4 However, the scientific use of drugs to induce statements
began in Texas, in 1922. The original discovery was made by a Texas
physician, Dr. Robert E. House, who had used scopolamine as an anes-
thetic in obstetrical cases. He reported his observation as follows:
My attention was first attracted to this peculiar phenomenon, Sept. 7, i916, while
conducting a case of labor under the influence of scopolamine. We desired to weigh the
baby, and inquired for the scales. The husband stated that he could not find them. The
wife, apparently sound asleep, spoke up and said: "They are in the kitchen on the nail
behind the picture." The fact that this woman suffered no pain and did not remember
when her child was delivered,yet could answer correctly a question she had overheard,
appealed to me so strongly that I decided to ascertain if that in reality was another
function of scopolamine.s
Dr. House became an enthusiastic advocate of scopolamine as a means
both of obtaining confessions from criminals and of clearing the innocent.
He was the first to use the phrase "truth serum" in professional literature
and he made wide claims for scopolamine, which later experience has nar-
rowed. Of persons under its influence, he announced: "At a certain stage
of the anesthesia they will reply to all 4uestions propounded with child-
like simplicity, with childlike honesty, without evasiveness, guilt, deceit,
or fraud." 6
After 1922, there are many recorded uses of scopolamine and other
drugs in criminal cases. In 1928, in Hawaii, hyoscine hydrobromide was
used with attendant publicity on a suspect in a murder investigation.
The suspect was arrested under highly incriminating circumstances. A
handwriting expert, who later changed his mind, clearly identified the
suspect's handwriting with that on a ransom note. Then, after a physician
administered the drug, the suspect admitted writing the ransom note and
described the procedure in detail. On emerging, he repudiated his con-
fession. A second injection brought negative results. Shortly afterward,
the real murderer was apprehended, and, as Lancet, the British medical
periodical commented, "it thus became unnecessary to exhaust the re-
sources of medicine in the attempt to extract a confession. ' 7
3 Father Nicholas de Leon in Camino del Cielo, cited in Goddard, How Science Solves
Crime: "Truth Serum," or Scopolamine, in the Interrogation of Criminal Suspects, io Hygeia
337 (x932).
4 Hart, Ebaugh, and Morgan, The Amytal Interview, 21o Am. J. Med. Sci. 125 (1945).
5 House, The Use of Scopolamine in Criminology, 18 Tex. State J. Med. 259, 261 (1927).
6 House, Why Truth Serum Should Be Made Legal, 42 Medico-Legal J. 138, 147 (1925).
7 Cross-Examination under Anesthetic, 215 Lancet 99o (1928).
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Scopolamine was used in Birmingham, Alabama, to obtain confessions
from a group of "axe murderers."& In 1931, a private crime detection or-
ganization in Chicago used it to learn the hiding place of stolen securities
and the whereabouts of missing robbers.9 In Kansas City, in 1935, police
used it successfully to obtain a confession from a suspect who insisted that
he had no conscious recollection of a murder he had committed while in-
toxicated.' ° Dr. House used it on at least eighty-four criminals or sus-
pects.Y At the University of Wisconsin, Dr. W. F. Lorenz used scopola-
mine and hyoscine hydrobromate [sic] extensively, and later sodium
amytal, which he found preferable. He recorded three striking cases in
which the use of the drug cleared innocent persons who had been held
under highly incriminating circumstances, and one of whom had even
falsely confessed the crime.2 By 1931, the Scientific Crime Detection
Laboratory of Northwestern University (now of the City of Chicago) had
been experimenting with scopolamine "for some time."'1 Undoubtedly,
the recorded uses and studies are only a small part of all that might be
found in the confidential records of police investigations and criminologi-
cal research.
Since 1929, paralleling the police use of drugs to obtain statements,
psychiatrists have made tremendous progress in the use of sodium amytal
and similar drugs to treat mental illness. Although the methods were
foreshadowed by advanced medical research workers as early as 1882,
marked progress began only in 1929.'4 For ten years before World War II,
psychiatrists used intravenous injection of barbiturates-sodium amytal,
evipan sodium, nembutal, and finally sodium pentothal-in part for the
same immediate end as the police, to obtain uninhibited expression of re-
pressed material by the subject. Remarkable results were obtained, and
the process was variously called narcoanalysis, narcosynthesis, narco-
hypnoanalysis, and amytal or pentothal interview.' s
s House, op. cit. supra note 6, at 138.
9 Chicago Sun, p. 2X, col. I (Aug. 7), 1946?
lO 26 Time 54 (Nov. IS, 1933), House, op. cit. supra note 6.
Lorenz, Criminal Confessions under Narcosis, 31 Wis. Med. J. 245 (932).
J House, The Use of Scopolamine in Criminology, 2 Am. J. of Police Science 328 (193).
,4 Greisinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics (1882); Starky, Light Ether Hypnosis,
91 Medical Record 631 (917); Bleckwenn, Production of Sleep and Rest in Psychotic Cases,
24 Arch. Neur. and Psych. 365 (i93o).
,5 Palmer and Braceland, Six Years Experience with Narcosis Therapy in Psychiatry, 94
Am. J. Psychiatry 37 (1937); Horsley, Narco-Analysis, 82 3. Mental Sci. 46 (936); Morrow,
The Psychiatric Uses of Intravenous Sodium Amytal, 8 Del. State Med. J. Iio (1936); Hart,
Ebaugh, and Morgan, op. cit. supra note 4.
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World War II brought a very great increase in the use of injections of
barbiturates in acute mental illness under combat conditions. After the
evacuation at Dunkirk in 1940, British psychiatrists reported their ex-
tensive and successful experiences. "6 After this country entered the war,
American psychiatrists used the procedure with satisfactory results.17
The great recent increase in scientific medical knowledge and the ex-
ceptional publicity given to the sodium pentothal injections in the
Heirens case demand consideration of the legal and other social problems
raised by the use of drugs to obtain statements. If the drugs really produce
the simple truth, there will be a great demand for their use.
What is the effect of sodium pentothal and related drugs? Drs. Sargant
and Slater describe it as follows:
It is commonplace that under the influence of alcohol a man reveals tendencies that
remain hidden in everyday life and may become suggestible, obstinate, euphoric, or
boastful. Tongues are loosened by drink; critical judgment is suspended and secret
aspirations, damaging confessions, and dramatic falsifications of previous events come
pouring out. Psychiatry has taken a trick and turned it into a technique. But what is
now sometimes graced with the high-sounding title of "narcoanalysis" is no more than
the method employed from time immemorial by the colonel in the mess to discover the
qualities of the newest subaltern. Instead of alcohol, whose effects take some time to
produce, are unreliable and difficult to control, we now 6mploy a barbiturate to which
these objections do not ,pply. But the effects are much the same. Both in the normal,
the neurotic, and the psychotic, the drug abolishes inhibitions and allows underlying
thought processes and preoccupations to appear. In addition, if there is much as-
sociated anxiety, this is partly at least abolished. The great value of the intravenous
barbiturate for diagnostic purposes in the psychotic is sometimes not sufficiently re-
alized. Under the influence of a suitable dose, the retarded depressive may become free,
able to talk, and even cheerful ..... There is reduction of the critical sense, an en-
hancement of rapport, and often a pouring out of both truth and fantasy equally. Ag-
gressive feelings, which would terrify the individual in his normal state, can be ex-
pressed without excessive anxiety and the emotional experiences of the past can be
lived anew without disturbances of the autonomic equilibrium.18
The following description is given by Dr. W. F. Lorenz:
There are certain drugs which will produce a mental state in which consciousness is
more or less profoundly affected. While in such a state of altered consciousness, an in-
dividual has lost a certain amount of control. He is unable to critically survey his re-
.6 Sargant and Slater, An Introduction to Somatic Mviethods of Treatment in Psychiatry
(1944).
17 Grinker and Spiegel, Men under Stress, 170-77 passim (1945); Erb and Bond, Sodium
Amytal Narcosis in Management of Emotional Disorders of Combat Flyers, 8 War Med. 146
(i945); Hastings, Glueck, and Wright, Sodium Amytal Narcosis in Treatment of Operational
Fatigue in Combat Air Crews, 5 War Med. 368 (944); Altman, Neuroses in Soldiers, 2 War
Med. 267 (1943).
18 Sargant and Slater, op. cit. supra note 16, at iii.
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sponses to questions. In such a condition his reactions are more or less automatic. The
continuity of consciousness, that is, the continued awareness of events that are actually
transpiring at the time is disturbed. His ability to associate thoughts, select, inhibit,
or carefully choose those to be expressed is impaired. Depending upon the drug and the
dose used, all degrees of disturbance of consciousness can be produced, ranging from
a vague sense of slight bewilderment to complete disorientation or unconsciousness.
Some drugs produce a delirium with vivid hallucinations, while others induce a state of
narcosis without hallucinations. In short, there is no "truth serum," but a state of mind
that can be induced by a variety of drugs.19
The authorities agree that the subject pours out both fact and fancy.
Dr. Lorenz observes: "Much care must be exercised by the experimenter
to evaluate the results. He must discriminate, if possible, what is the prod-
uct of fantasy and what of fact. '20
Although some persons retain their characteristic defenses even under
influence of the drug,21 the degree and effect of suggestibility are greatly
heightened.22
In psychotherapy, the physician's skill depends on his obtaining re-
citals of internal, external, and mixed events, and on his ability to suggest
developments and reconciliations. In law, we reject for untrustworthiness
a method of interrogation which mingles external events with imaginary
occurrences and shapes the answers of the subject to the suggestions of the
examiner. Thus, however striking their medical uses, the drugs are not
"truth serums"; they dissolve inhibitions and tend to stimulate unre-
pressed expressions of external fact, of fancy, and of suggestion.
II
Under American and British law, a criminal confession made under the
influence of a drug would be inadmissible in evidence because of the rule
against involuntary confessions. On this point, all writers on the subject
agree. 23 If a state court admitted such a confession, the United States
19 Lorenz, op. cit. supra note 12. 20 Ibid., at 246. Italics added.
21 Sargant and Slater, op. cit. supra note i6, at 1i5; Grinker and Spiegel,.The Management
of Neuropsychiatric Casualties in the Zone of Combat, in Solomon and Yakovlev, Manual of
Military Neuropsychiatry 53o (1944); Hart, Ebaugh, and Morgan, op. cit. supra note 4, at
129; Morrow, op. cit. supra note i;, at 112.
-Altman, op. cit. supra note 17, at 271; Stungo, Evipan Hypnosis in Psychiatric Out-
patients, 24o Lancet 507 (1941); Lorenz, op. cit. supra note 12, at 247.
23 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 841, 998 (3 d ed., 394o); Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof § 311
t3 d ed., 1937); Larson, Lying and Its Detection 204-20 (1932); McCormick, Deception-Tests
and the Law of Evidence, i5 Calif. L. Rev. 484, 492, 503 (2927); Methods of Scientific Crime
Detection as Infringements of Personal Rights, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 845 (I93i); Inbau, Self-
Incrimination-What Can an Accused Person Be Compelled To Do? 28 J. Crim. L. and Crimi-
nology 261, 288 (i037); Kleinfeld, The Detection of Deception-A Resume, 8 Fed. Bar J. 153,
167-7r (I947); see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. i8i, 193, x88 S.W. 2d 43, 51 (1945).
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Supreme Court would reverse the conviction under its decisions that use
of a coerced confession is not due process of law.' The American Law
Institute Model Code of Evidence has stated the bases of the rule as
follows:
It is impossible to explain upon one theory all the cases dealing with improperly
induced confessions. In some the exclusion seems to rest on nothing more substantial
than the notion that an accused is entitled to a sporting chance. From a consideration
of many others the deduction has been made that the moving, though unarticulated,
reason is that prosecuting authorities are prone to rely too heavily upon confessions
and to neglect the thorough investigation which they would otherwise make and which
their duty demands; therefore the temptation to use improper inducements to obtain
confessions must be removed. This is the primary theory of the Rule. Most of the
judicial opinions, however, put the rejection of evidence of improperly secured con-
fessions on the ground that there is great danger that such confessions may be false.25
On whatever basis the rule rests, a confession induced by a drug ought to
be excluded. There is great danger that it may be false. It is subject to
being mingled with fancy. It is subject to being molded by the suggestions
of the interrogator. In the hands of incompetent or unethical interroga-
tors, a suspect can make a wide variety of unreliable statements.
In conceding that courts should exclude confessions induced by drugs,
writers have said that the use of drugs for that purpose had not yet re-
ceived sufficient scientific acceptance.26 Perhaps the conclusion sometimes
covers a revulsion at the oppressive uses to which the practice might be
put by the authorities. By now, scientific investigation has not only ad-
vanced the medical uses of the drugs but has also revealed the unrelia-
bility of the confession for courtroom purposes by showing increasingly
the subconscious elements which enter it.' 7
If the rule against involuntary confessions is designed to induce thorough
investigation by the prosecutor, who might otherwise yield to the feeling
that "it is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pep-
per into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evi-
dence,"'28 then certainly confessions induced by drugs ought to be ex-
cluded. Otherwise, the authorities might often be tempted simply to round
24 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944),
noted in 57 Harv. L. Rev. gig (i944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (i942); The United States
Supreme Court Interpretation of Admissibility of Criminal Confessions, 36 J. Crim. L. and
Criminology 222 (1945).
s Rule 505, Comment (C). 26 Wigmore, Evidence § 841, 998 (3d ed., 194o).
' See Hudson, Psychological Problems Relating to Criminal Confessions of Innocent Per-
sons, i8 Medico-Legal J. 84 (iooo), for a discussion of the influence of suggestion in inducing
confessions from the innocent.
28 I Stephens, History of Criminal Law 442 (1883).
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up suspects and inject drugs, instead of making a thorough investigation
of all the circumstances of the crime.
The "sporting chance" notion for excluding involuntary confessions
has often received contemptuous treatment from writers. Bentham de-
rided it, calling it the" fox-hunters' reason. 12 9 However, it appears to have
far more validity than the grace of the fox-hunter.3° The individual citizen
ought to be free from oppression by the law-enforcing authorities, and the
use of drugs to obtain statements opens tremendous possibilities for op-
pression. On technically sufficient warrants, persons might be arrested and
subjected to interrogation. Under the influence of drugs, their secrets,
their wishes, their subconscious hostilities, would soon become police
property, and many private details, better left hidden, could be used to
embarrass or destroy the subject. Although the drug injection would lack
the physical discomfort of torture, it would, nevertheless, be an effective
method of torture whose results in ruined lives might far exceed the dis-
comforts of the conventional third degree. Surely, on the basis of prevent-
ing unfair oppression, the rule is properly applied to exclude confessions
induced by drugs. There might be no incongruity in the use of drugs in a
system of Continental European criminal procedure which subjects the
accused to inquisitorial cross-examination and permits both his silence and
his speech to be used by the prosecution. More than fifty years ago, a
Dutch statute expressly permitted the police authorities to use hypnotism
for the purpose of obtaining information; but even there the statement
itself was made inadmissible.3'
Courts have excluded as involuntary other confessions which resemble
those induced by drugs. A confession which appeared to be made under
hypnotic influence was held involuntary as was one made under the influ-
ence of a clairvoyant.32 At about the beginning of the century, the ques-
tion of using confessions by hypnosis was widely discussed in the United
States, and the medical and legal professions apparently agreed that sug-
gestibility played too great a role in the confessions, because" even honest
questioning may act as false suggestion. '' 3 A confession made in sleep is
29 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. 9, c. 3.
3oMcCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 451-57
(1938).
31 Hypnotism and the Law, 95 Law Times 500 (1893).
32 Rex v. Booher, [1928] Dom. L. Rep. 795 (Alberta), noted in 42 Harv. L. Rev. 704 (929);
State v. Strong, 83 N.J.L. 177, i88, 83 A. 5o6, 510 (1912); see People v. Ebanks, i17 Cal. 652,
49 Pac. 1049 (i897).
33 Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, ii Yale L. J. 173 (i9o2); Bannister, Hypnotic Influ-
ence in Criminal Cases, 51 Albany L. J. 87, 88 (z895); see Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof
§ 32' (3d ed., 1937).
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also involuntary; 34 but since sleep, unlike the injection of sodium pento-
thal, is a phenomenon with which all men are acquainted, the Supreme
Court of West Virginia, in i8gi, was willing to trust a jury to decide
whether a defendant was awake or asleep; and, if asleep, whether she was
speaking the truth when she said: "They have devilled me so much about
this that I don't care how it goes; I only consented to his death and gave
him the poison." The court said:
It was a question of fact, which the jury was competent to decide, whether the pris-
oner was awake or asleep when the ejaculation was made. We must assume that it was
discussed before the jury in lights applicable to the subject, to enable the jury to make
an intelligent estimate of its weight. It was with them to say whether it was made in
sleep, and was therefore worthless, or whether, though in sleep, it was but the divul-
gence of truth, springing from guilt which rested heavy on the soul, and broke forth
through voice and lips, the half conscious man revealing secrets, indelibly impressed on
the memory, which, if fully awake, he would fain have suppressed. It was with the jury
to say whether she was fully awake, and forgot herself, and in tis soliloquy spoke out
the truth. The operation of the human mind is an enigma, and its expressions in the
unconsciousness of sleep are frequently vagaries and fictions, but sometimes born of
reality.3s
Although the court's language sounds like a modern description of a sub-
ject under sodium pentothal, probably even the same court would not
trust a jury to weigh a statement induced by the drug. Courts have also
let juries decide the value of confessions made when a defendant was said
to be intoxicated 36 or hysterical.37
It might be argued that statements induced by drugs should be admit-
ted on the same basis that courts receive the results of other involuntary
physical tests. Courts have gone far in admitting evidence of physical
tests, made in or out of court, which have been established as accurate 8
Thus, many courts have admitted evidence of blood and respiration tests
for intoxication, medical examination for pregnancy and diseases, finger-
printing, and even psychiatric examinations. 39 Short of the invasion of a
34 People v. Robinson, ig Cal. 41 (1861).
35 State v. Morgan, 35 W.Va. 260, 265, 13 S.E. 385, 386 (18gi).
36 Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30 (,854).
37 People v. Lehin, 209 Cal. 336, 287 Pac. 337 (1930).
38 State v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646 (1876).
39Inbau, op. cit. supra note 23; 25 Ore. L. Rev. 270 (1946), noting State v. Cram, 176
Ore. 577, x6o P. 2d 283 (1945); Blood Test for Intoxication in Criminal Cases, i941 Wis. L.
Rev. 249; Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic
Intoxication, 36 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 132 (1945); Intoxication Tests as a Violation of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 122 (1941); Compulsory
Bodily Action or Exhibition as Violating the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 17 Minn. L.
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superior right of privacy or the infliction of direct pain or suffering on the
accused, there is now no doubt that he can be compelled to exhibit his
physical characteristics for many tests which have wide acceptance for ac-
curacy. Does this tendency of the courts indicate that statements made
under the influence of drugs may also be held to be admissible? In reaching
their decisions, all courts and all text writers have said that the rules
against self-incrimination and involuntary confessions refer to verbal ut-
terances. 40 The breath, the blood, the fingers, and other organs will be al-
lowed to present mute evidence under the interpretation of the tester; but
words have been excluded. Even in ordering psychiatric examinations,
courts have not ordered defendants to speak if they refused. 4' Sustain-
ing a lower court order for such an examination, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana said: "He was forced to do nothing; he was looked at and spoken
to; but even a cat may look at a queen, and no one need answer when
spoken to unless he wishes to.1142 The distinction between verbal and
physical compulsion has a valid historical basis, because the abuses in
compelling self-incrimination and involuntary confessions were predomi-
nantly concerned with verbal utterances; but the distinction seems to be
based also on accepting the dualism of body and mind, admitting the
evidence of the body, but not of the mind. Under the impact of modern
psychology, the "mind" as generally conceived is fleeing to ever deeper
recesses, leaving more and more functions to the "body." One day, verbal
utterances may be deemed mere "physical characteristics," and the use of
statements induced by drugs may be admissible in mixed courts of
medicine and of law. So long, however, as the law holds a criminal respon-
sible for his wilful crime and punishes him, it is unlikely that Anglo-Ameri-
can courts as we know them will hold forcibly obtained verbal statements
equally admissible with footprints, fingerprints, and blood tests.
Most American courts do, however, make a fine distinction between
confessions and admissions. 43 Although a confession is admissible only if
Rev. 187 (i933); 13 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. io3 (1944), noting State v. Shannon, 182 S.W. 2d
384 (Ark., 1944). Compulsory Subjection to Physical Examination by a Doctor as Violating
the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, i7 Notre Dame Lawyer 243 (1942); Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2265 (3d ed., i94o); Kemner, Power of Courts to Compel Defendants in Criminal Cases
to Submit to Physical Examination, 4 Ind. L.J. 456 (1929).
40 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (191o); Greenleaf, Evidence § 469c (i6th ed.,
1899); The Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 49 Yale LJ. io59, 1O62 (1940).
41 State v. Coleman, 96 W.Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924); People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198,
79 N.E. 978 (1924); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, i N.E. 2d 189 (1936).
42 State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 724, 112 So. 655, 66o (1927).
43 Wigmore, Evidence § 821 (3 d ed., 1940); Wharton, Criminal Evidence §§ 592, 646 (iith
ed., i935).
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it is voluntary, an admission need not be shown to have been made volun-
tarily. Wigmore explains the difference by saying that a confession is an
acknowledgment " in express words by the accused in a criminal case of the
truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it," while an
admission is an acknowledgment "of subordinate facts colorless with ref-
erence to actual guilt." Since majority opinion admits involuntary
admissions, there seems to be no obstacle to the admission in evidence of
a mere involuntary admission, even if made under the influence of a drug.
The distinction is a fine one and hardly seems realistic or desirable.44
Nevertheless, if a court could draw a distinction between a mere admission
and a confession under the influence of a drug, the admission might be
received.
The regularity of the law in refusing to admit confessions induced by
drugs does not remove such drugs from the world nor settle the many
problems raised by their increasing use. Although the prosecution is
clearly foreclosed from offering the involuntary confession, the defense
may want to offer a statement in proof of innocence. Dr. W. F. Lorenz of
the University of Wisconsin reports that the use of drugs is far more ef-
fective in clearing the innocent.than confounding the guilty45
May a defendant support his innocence by offering testimony of state-
ments made while under the influence of a drug? The rejection of such an
offer was sustained by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1926, which said:
It was sought to introduce in evidence the deposition of a doctor residing elsewhere,
who testified to the effect that he had administered to the defendant what he termed
a "truth-telling serum," and that while under its influence the defendant had denied
his guilt. Testimony of this character-barring the sufficient fact that it cannot be
otherwise classified than as a self-serving declaration-is, in the present state of human
knowledge, unworthy of serious consideration. We are not told from what well this
serum is drawn or in what alembic its alleged truth-compelling powers are distilled. Its
origin is as nebulous as its effect is uncertain. A belief in its potency, if it has any exist-
ence, is confined to the modem Cagliostro, who still, as Balsamo did of old, cozen the
credulous for a quid pro quo, by inducing them to believe in the magic powers of
philters, potions and cures by faith. The trial court therefore, whether it assigned a
reason for its action or not, ruled correctly in excluding this clap-trap from the con-
sideration of the jury. Cogent reasons based upon numerous rulings, cited in the re-
spondent's brief, bear ample testimony to support the wisdom of the court's ruling.46
Undoubtedly, the ruling but not the language of the Missouri Supreme
Court would be universally followed today even though modern psychi-
44 Gorham, Involuntary Admissions Should Not Be Competent Evidence, 19 Temp. L. Q.
485 (1946).
45 Lorenz, op. cit. supra note 12, at 249.
46 State v. Hudson, 314 MO. 599, 289 S.W. 920 (1926).
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atrists effect cures with sodium pentothal of which Cagliostro and Bal-
samo never dreamed. The unreliable nature of the statement and the sug-
gestibility of the subject would make any court hesitate to disorganize a
trial by allowing admission. Upon similar offers by defendants, courts have
refused to admit in evidence the results of lie-detector tests involving
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, electrical skin response, and muscular
tension.47 Although widely used by police, by employers, by insuranc6
companies, and others to detect deception, the "lie detector" test has not
yet established itself as sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible in evi-
dence. 4 Undoubtedly, courts also give weight to the apprehension that a
sincere but mistaken application of its use, much more an unscrupulous
one, would impede trials. One court has refused to admit the tests of a lie
detector, even on stipulation of both sides.48a By still stronger reasoning,
the statement influenced by a drug would be excluded whether offered by
prosecution or defense.
I"I
Even though the resultant statement is inadmissible, the authorities
will undoubtedly continue to experiment with drugs and probably con-
tinue to use them to induce statements. It might readily occur that a sus-
pect, when told that a drug would be administered, would make a full con-
fession, perhaps in fear that otherwise even more crimes might be re-
vealed. Would the confession be admissible? If the confession were made
under the direct threat that a drug test would be administered, it would
probably be excluded because made under a physical threat. But suppose
an involuntary drug test were actually made, and later the suspect were
informed, either truthfully or by trickery, that he had made a confession
and were then induced or tricked into making a complete confession. Al-
though English legal authorities reject the view that the state may use
trickery to obtain confessions, 49 American courts allow its use, so long,
they say, as trickery is used in a manner calculated to obtain truthful
resultssO
47 34 A.L.R. 147 (1924); 86 A.L.R. 6W6 (1933); 119 A.L.R. 1200 (1939); 139 A.L.R. 1174
(1942); contra: People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (i938), in effect overruled by
People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E. 2d 31 (I938); Smallwood, Lie Detectors: Discussion
and Proposals, 29 Corn. L. Q. 535 (1944); Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, x6
N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 202 (1939).
48 See People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503 (1942).
4SaLeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W. 2d 288 (1943).
49 Non Tall Auxilio, 92 L.J. 204 (1942).
so WVigmore, Evidence § 841 (3d ed.. io4O): Commonwealth v. Ripple, 333 Pa. 33,39,3 A.
2d 353, 356 (1939).
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Similar problems have accompanied the use of lie detectors. One of the
values of using a lie detector is authoritatively said to be that "the instru-
ment, the tests, and the accompanying procedures have a decided psycho-
logical effect in inducing admissions from guilty individuals." S' Recently
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the prosecution
offered a confession made while defendant was involuntarily subjected to
a lie-detector test. The court said that the wrongful test "influenced, if it
did not induce" the involuntary confession.52 In Canada, the Alberta Su-
preme Court unhesitatingly rejected a confession made immediately after
hypnosis by a Crown agent.53 Similarly, a confession induced after an
involuntary drug interview should likewise not be admissible. Earlier deci-
sions in other courts have admitted confessions made after inadmissible
compulsory lie-detector tests, when defendants were induced to confess
because they believed that the tests had demonstrated their guilt."S
If the authorities persist in using drugs to obtain inadmissible involun-
tary statements, may they nevertheless use the facts learned through the
statements, or are they barred from using the "fruit of the poisonous
tree"? American courts permit the prosecution to use evidence discovered
through the involuntary confession of an accused, even though the con-
fession itself is inadmissible55 The United States Supreme Court and a
minority of the states have modified the rule, but only to reject the use of
papers and things obtained by illegal search or seizure.56 The facts ob-
tained are not "sacred and inaccessible" but may be proved if knowledge
of them is also gained from an independent source. In a special group of
cases, the cases of illegal wire tapping under the Communications Act of
1935, the Supreme Court has prohibited the use of all evidence obtained
as a direct result of such wire tapping, because the prohibition of wire-tap-
ping evidence would be meaningless unless the court also prohibits the
5' Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L. Rev. 264 (1946).
s2 People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 72, 69 N.E. 2d 336, 338 (1946).
53 Rex v. Booher, [1928] 4 Dom. L. Rep. 795.
54 State v. Dehart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W. 2d 360 (1943); Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa.
541, ig A. 2d 389 (I94i); Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (I939), discussed
in 13 Medico-Legal and Criminological Rev. 202 (1945).
55 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed., i94o); 18 Tex. L. Rev. 504 (194o), noting Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
56 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Whether Harris v. United
States, 67 S. Ct. io98 (1947), heralds a modification of this rule cannot be determined until the
courts have opportunity to decide whether the principle it announces is a contraction of the
illegal search concept or of the illegal evidence concept.
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"fruit of the poisonous tree. '5 7 Even in these cases, however, the Supreme
Court has said that the rule does not prohibit the use against a party of
the facts learned by the illegal interception of evidence, if the connection
is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."8
If the courts will permit the authorities to use any facts learned during
drug interviews, is there not then a powerful incentive to use drugs to ob-
tain information leading to admissible evidence? If the individual is to be
adequately protected from the oppressive use of drugs, it would seem that
the Supreme Court ought to construe due process to prohibit using the
fruits of the involuntary confession. Such a result would impose no hard-
ship upon prosecuting authorities. To avoid the confusion of proving
which facts were learned properly and which by drug interrogation, the
authorities need simply refrain from injecting the drug. If the rights of all
individuals are to be effectively protected from promiscuous involuntary
use of the injection, then courts must exclude any evidence obtained by
its use, however attenuated. Otherwise:
To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on their
full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed "inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty."s9
IV
How may an individual protect himself if the authorities threaten him
with involuntary injection of a drug? Certainly he could obtain an injunc-
tion restraining such interference with his personal rights.6° The right to
be free from interrogations by means of drugs seems clearly to be a right
of privacy which courts protect.6 In i940, a New Jersey court held that
an individual's right of privacy was invaded even by a blood test to ex-
clude paternity. The court said:
But if we admit such an encroachment upon the personal immunity of an individual
where in principle can we stop? Suppose medical discovery in the future evolves a tech-
nique whereby the truth may infallibly be secured from a witness by trepanning his
skull and testing the functions of the brain beneath. No one would contend that the
witness could be forced against his will to undergo such a major operation at the im-
"7Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). But see United States v. Bayer, 67 S. Ct.
1394, 1398 (1947)-
s8 Ibid., at 341. 59 Ibid., at 340.
6o State v. Mayer (unreported), Superior Court of King County, Washington (Nov. 23,
1929), digested in National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Law-
lessness in Law Enforcement 151 (193i).
61 Methods of Scientific Crime Detection as Infringements of Personal Rights, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 842, 845 (1931).
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minent risk of his life, in order to secure evidence in a suit between private parties.
How then can he be forced to undergo a less dangerous operation, and at what point
shall the line be drawn? To my mind, it is not the degree of risk to life, health or happi-
ness which is the determinative factor, but the fact of the invasion of the constitutional
right to personal privacy.62
When the law has permitted a new scientific test to invade an individ-
ual's privacy, it has demanded at least accuracy before it permitted the in-
vasion. But the use of drugs induces verbal statements which are subject
to suggestion, contain a large and perhaps dangerous admixture of fact
and fancy, include involuntary facts concerning his entire past life, and in
addition may uncover his deepest wishes, his subconscious hostilities,
and his personal secrets affecting both his life and the lives of others. There
could hardly be a greater claim to the right of privacy nor a greater ur-
gency for injunctive relief.
In many states, the extracting of involuntary confessions is penalized by
statutes, which would also provide an additional basis for civil or criminal
action.6 3 However, injunction procedure would often be too slow to pre-
vent the completed act. Moreover, a suit for damages and a prosecution
for violation of a statute would depend upon the willingness of a jury to
assess damages and of the prosecuting authorities themselves to institute
prosecution. Thus, the individual is left with no effective remedies against
drug injections unless the courts exclude the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
with such finality that prosecuting authorities will not be under any legal
temptation to infringe on the rights of individuals. An individual would
then be free, if he wished, to consent to a drug interview, if he felt that it
would be helpful to him; but he would also be free from the risk of invol-
untary injection.
V
Since we can fairly expect that the authorities may continue to use drugs
to induce statements, unless checked, what are the duties of the physician
who administers the drug? If he administers it at the request of the prose-
cuting authorities for the purpose of obtaining an involuntary confession,
he is a participant in their act and shares their legal responsibility. In his
case, however, the possibility of revocation of license must be added to
other possible consequences. Dr. W. F. Lorenz says that in a criminal in-
vestigation, no physician should ever administer a drug to induce a state-
62 Bednarik v. Bednarik, x8 N.J. Misc. 633, 652, 16 A. 2d 8o, go (I94O), noted in 89 U. ofPa. L. Rev. 518 (1941).
63 National Commission of Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit. supra note 6o, App. .3
(193').
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ment except in the presence of a representative of the suspect, and then
only after full explanation and consent.64
Suppose, however, that in the course of his proper medical use of sodium
pentothal, the physician hears a confession of a crime. May he reveal the
crime? Must he reveal it if questioned? Since mentally ill people include
many persons who are criminals as a result of their illness, there should be
an assurance that the criminal personality who seeks the best mental
treatment, like the penitent who seeks absolution, should be free to seek.
it and receive it without fear that his deeds would thereby be revealed.
The Hippocratic Oath lays the following moral obligation on the physi-
cian:
What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treat-
ment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will
keep to myself holding such things shameful -to be spoken about.
Undoubtedly, most physicians have high personal standards safeguarding
the confidences of the patient. Nevertheless, the common law and the law
of approximately one-third of our states recognize no legal privilege in the
communication from patient to physician; and the remaining states limit
,the privilege to information necessary to enable the physician to act pro-
fessionally. 5 In those states which recognize the privilege, a psychiatrist
ought to be successful in establishing that any statement made in a
sodium pentothal interview constitutes information necessary to enable
him to act professionally.
The drugs have been highly useful in identifying victims of amnesia who
are unable to give their names and addresses. 6 If other means are ex-
hausted, ought not the law-enforcing authorities to be permitted to have a
physician use sodium pentothal so as to restore the victim to his proper
environment? Even if in the course of such an exploration, a physician in-
evitably hears a confession of a crime, it would seem that the patient-
physician privilege, where it exists, should protect him from disclosure, on
the theory that all the disclosures made during the interview are necessary
to enable him to act professionally; and his ethical standards ought to re-
quire him to conduct the examination privately so as to limit his work to
64 Lorenz, op. cit. supra note 12, at 248, 249.
6sWigmore, Evidence § 2380(1940); Chaffee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served
or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 Yale L.J. 607 (i943);
Physician and Patient, 183 Law Times 337 (1937).
66 Morrow, op. cit. supra note 1s, at 112. Mosier and Harnes, The Identification of an
Amnesia Victim by the Use of Scopolamine-An Experiment, 26 J. Crim. L. and Criminology
43' ('935).
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medical care and guard against disclosure of utterances except through his
medical report. Although in some cases, the physician who examines or
treats a suspect in police custody is held to be acting as physician for the
state and to be outside the physician-patient privilege,67 in no case has
he been permitted to testify to involuntary verbal communications.
Although the therapeutic use of sodium pentothal and related drugs by
physicians ought to be encouraged in every way, and although suspects
should be free to use it before trial under proper safeguards to assure a
voluntary decision, the involuntary use of such drugs on criminal suspects
is premature until society fully accepts the principle and practice that
lawbreakers are to be treated and corrected rather than punished, and that
the aim of criminal administration should be the speedy cure, rehabilita-
tion, and restoration of the criminal without regard to traditional ideas of
retribution and public punishment. So long as the state enacts laws to
punish lawbreakers, and so long as the enforcement of such punishment
can be directed or withheld by prosecuting authorities,' the use of drugs to
induce statements can be a powerful force for the oppression of individual
citizens. We may expect that people closely identified with law-enforcing
authorities will press for the widespread police use of such drugs in all
criminal cases. Such a use would threaten everyone, without exception,
save for those in ultimate control of political power. The drugs could be
used to explore the life and thoughts and wishes of anyone on whom the
authorities choose to use them.
One serious proponent of widespread use of such drugs to obtain state-
ments in criminal cases has announced that the struggle to legalize their
involuntary use will be "long and bitter.' '6 Under our present system of
laws, the struggle to legalize the involuntary use of such drugs will not
only be long and bitter but probably unsuccessful as well.
67Leard v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 191, 235 Pac. 243 (1925); State v. Coleman, o6 W. Va.
544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924).
68 Goddard, How Science Solves Crime: "Truth Serum," or Scopolamine, in the Interroga-
tion of Criminal Suspects, io Hygeia 337 (i932).
